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I. Introduction 
A. Oklahoma Economy: The SCOOP & STACK 
The State of Oklahoma has a rich history of oil and gas development along 
with an economy that has become highly dependent on oil and gas operations 
within the state. According to the Oklahoma Energy Resource Board 
(“OERB”), Oklahoma is the fourth-largest producer of crude oil and the 
third-largest producer of natural gas in the country.1 Historically, some of the 
most sought-after oil and gas drilling and production locations in the country 
have been found in Oklahoma.2 The “highly developed” infrastructure of the 
industry in the southern states has significantly contributed to Oklahoma’s 
superior development in the natural resource industry.3 In reference to 
Oklahoma oil fields, oil and gas analyst Jason Carnovale of the Freedonia 
Group said, “[n]ot only do they possess strong individual wells, initial 
production (“IP”) rates and competitive drilling costs, these oil fields feature 
stacked formations.”4 
Along with Oklahoma’s advantageous infrastructural position, the state is 
home to the South Central Oklahoma Oil Province (“SCOOP”) and the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Scoop & Stack: Breaking Down the Economic Impact of O&NG Reserves, ENERGY 
HQ: POWERED BY THE OKLAHOMA ENERGY RESOURCE BOARD, https://energyhq.com/ 
2018/06/scoop-stack-breaking-down-the-economic-impact-of-ong-reserves/ (last visited Jan. 
22, 2019). 
 2. Daniel Debelius, Layer Cakes: The Geology of Oklahoma’s SCOOP and STACK, 
FREEDONIA (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.freedoniagroup.com/Content/Blog/2017/08/10/ 
Layer-Cakes--The-Geology-of-Oklahomas-SCOOP-and-STACK. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/3
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Sooner Trend Anadarko Canadian Kingfisher (“STACK”) shale plays.5 The 
SCOOP, in particular, includes parts of Caddo, Grady, Comanche, Stephens, 
McClain, Carter, Love, Murray and Garvin counties.6 The SCOOP, 
importantly, overlaps with the geological province under scrutiny in the 
Meier v. Chesapeake case—the Arbuckle Uplift.7 The SCOOP and STACK 
plays are layered with multiple dense formations, including the Woodford 
Shale formation which is known for its high yields of oil and condensate.8  
B. Underground Injection Wells 
The Federal Safe Water Drinking Act (“SWDA”) of 1974 protects the 
public by regulating the quality of drinking water.9 Pursuant to the Act, a 
program was enacted to regulate underground sources of public drinking 
water.10 Under the program, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
sets out minimum requirements for state underground injection control 
(“UIC”) programs.11 Oklahoma’s UIC program was approved by the EPA in 
1981, granting the state authority over the entire state, except for the Osage 
Indian Reserve.12 The Oklahoma Corporation Commission (“OCC”) is 
vested with control over Class II wells under 52 O.S. 2011 § 139(B)(1)(f).13 
Since 1981, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has held primacy for 
approval and regulation of underground injection wells.14 Particularly, within 
the OCC’s jurisdiction are Class II wells under the Federal Underground 
Injection Control Program.15 Class II wells consist of disposal wells, 
enhanced recovery wells, and hydrocarbon storage wells.16  
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Maps: Oil and Gas Exploration, Resources, and Production, U.S. ENERGY 
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, https://www.eia.gov/maps/maps.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 
2019).  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Matt Menchaca, Oklahoma Oil and Gas: Woodford SCOOP Wells Have Stamina, 
DRILLING INFO (Jan. 14, 2014), https://info.drillinginfo.com/oklahoma-oil-and-gas-woodford-
scoop-wells-stamina/. See also Bob Black, Exactly What is Condensate and Why is its Export 
Prohibited?, DRILLING INFO (Jan. 6, 2015), https://info.drillinginfo.com/what-exactly-is-
condensate/ (providing background information on condensate). 
 9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f, et seq. (West 2016). 
 10. Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC, 248 F.Supp. 3d 1194, 1200 (W.D. Okla. 
2017). 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 §139(B)(1)(f) (2011). 
 16. EPA Underground Injection Control Program, 40 C.F.R § 144.6 (West 2011).  
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Operators most commonly use disposal wells to dispose of wastewater 
generated from production and hydraulic fracturing.17 Hydraulic fracturing is 
a method used to create new pathways in a formation for hydrocarbons to 
flow.18 This method permanently changes the formation’s geology.19 Water 
from both production and hydraulic fracturing have high levels of brine from 
ancient formations and other materials that cannot be allowed to mix with the 
ground or drinking water.20 Operators often inject wastewater into the 
depleted wellbores of formations that previously held oil and gas, using them 
as disposal wells.21  
Contrary to popular belief, approximately ninety-five percent of the 
wastewater injected into disposal wells is produced water—formation water 
that is extracted along with oil and gas—not flowback fluid.22 “Flowback 
fluid” refers to the fluid that flows back up the wellbore after hydraulic 
fractionation stages are complete.23 This fluid often contains brine, 
chemicals, and sometimes naturally occurring radioactive material.24 
Flowback tends to be highly toxic and is often disposed of by injection into 
underground disposal wells along with produced waters.25 Recovery of 
hydraulic fracturing water from a reservoir is, in most cases, less than fifty 
percent.26 
C. The Arbuckle Uplift and Seismicity  
The Arbuckle Uplift is a geological province that lies under a large portion 
of Oklahoma.27 The formation has high porosity and is, therefore, commonly 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Monika U. Ehrman, Earthquakes in the Oilpatch: The Regulatory Legal Issues 
Arising out of Oil and Gas Operation Induced Seismicity, 33 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 609, 626–
27 (2017).  
 18. Monika U. Ehrman, The Next Great Compromise: A Comprehensive Response to 
Opposition Against Shale Gas Development Using Hydraulic Fracturing in the United States, 
46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 423 (2014). 
 19. Id.  
 20. Ehrman, supra note 17. 
 21. Id. at 627. 
 22. Seth Whitehead, Oklahoma Earthquakes Have Decreased Rapidly Since 2015, 
UNITED STATE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (APRIL 6, 2018), https://www.energyindepth.org/ 
oklahoma-earthquake-declines-continue-first-quarter-2018/. 
 23. Ehrman, supra note 18, at 433–34. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Joe Wertz, A Popular but Poorly Understood Oklahoma Rock Layer is Keeping 
Earthquake Secrets, STATE IMPACT: OKLAHOMA, https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/ 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/3
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used for wastewater disposal because it can absorb large amounts of water.28 
In 2014, Oklahoma was considered the most seismically active state—even 
more so than California.29 During 2015–2017, the OCC issued several 
directives and reduction plans to reduce the amount of wastewater disposed 
into the Arbuckle formation due to concerns about induced seismicity.30 The 
OCC, as part of its 2015 response, ordered 92 operators of 347 disposal wells 
to proffer proof that no granite “basement rock” was being disturbed by their 
wells.31  
Issues of man-induced seismicity are often found where disposal wells are 
drilled too deeply into basement rock.32 Seismicity has much to do with the 
underlying fault lines of the area.33 In Oklahoma, for example, the plates are 
“squeezing the region from east to west, which results in most earthquakes 
occurring along a northwest-southwest fault.”34 Faults are located in 
basement rock.35 Ancient basement rock tends to fracture along major faults 
under duress.36 So, “[t]he deeper you inject, the more likely it is that the 
injected brine is going to make its way into seismogenic fault zone, prone to 
producing earthquakes.”37  
Ultimately, the location of the disposal wells in conjunction with the 
relative fault scheme of the area, creates the propensity for injection to cause 
earthquakes. Consequently, the majority of Oklahoma’s disposal wells are 
not likely to induce earthquakes—only those drilled too deeply into the 
basement rock.38 Importantly, since the introduction of the 2015 mandates, 
induced seismic activity in Oklahoma has seen a rapid decline.39 In fact, the 
                                                                                                                 
2015/11/30/a-popular-but-poorly-understood-oklahoma-rock-layer-is-keeping-earthquake-
secrets/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
 28. Ehrman, supra note 17. 
 29. Earthquakes, STATE IMPACT: OKLAHOMA, https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/tag/ 
earthquakes/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).  
 30. Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC, 248 F. Supp.3d 1194, 1202 (W.D. Okla. 
2017). The OCC’s response to seismic activity in the formation began as early as 2013. 
 31. STATE IMPACT: OKLAHOMA, supra note 29.  
 32. Ariane Wu, Are We Causing Earthquakes in Oklahoma? (Aug. 17, 2015), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-08-17/are-we-causing-earthquakes-oklahoma. 
 33. Ehrman, supra note 17.  
 34. Id. (citation omitted).  
 35. Wu, supra note 32. 
 36. Ehrman, supra note 17.  
 37. Id. at 627–28 (citation omitted).  
 38. Whitehead, supra note 22. 
 39. Id.  
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average daily felt earthquake count for the first few months of 2018 was 
seventy-nine percent lower than that of 2015.40 
Some blame hydraulic fracturing, in part, for induced seismicity.41 
However, it has been generally accepted that hydraulic fracturing activities 
rarely—if at all—cause earthquakes within the United States.42 In light of 
same, the regulatory scheme imposed to regulate injection wells, the Safe 
Water Drinking Act, specifically omits hydraulic fracturing activity from the 
regulatory scheme, unless there is injection with diesel.43 The Safe Water 
Drinking Act specifically excludes “the underground injection of fluids or 
propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing 
operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities[,]” from its 
definition of “underground injection.”44 
II. Law before the case 
A. Jurisdiction  
The question before the court in Meier v. Chesapeake Operating was one 
of first impression for Oklahoma courts. Therefore, it was appropriate that 
the district court, sitting in diversity, review whether or not the Property 
Owners should be allowed to recover insurance premiums, in the absence of 
Oklahoma substantive law, based off of how the court predicted the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule on the matter.45 The court, in making 
the prediction, was “free to consider all resources available, including 
decision of [Oklahoma] courts, other state courts and federal courts, in 
addition to the general weight and trend of authority.”46 
 B. Recovery of Insurance Premiums 
Insurance premiums have sometimes been awarded as damages in civil 
suits. In Seifts v. Consumer Health Solutions LLC, participants in a health 
insurance plan were awarded insurance premiums paid as recovery for a 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id.  
 41. Ker Than, Oklahoma Earthquakes Linked to Oil and Gas Wastewater Disposal Wells, 
Say Stanford Researchers, STANFORD UNIVERSITY NEWS (June 18, 2015), 
https://news.stanford.edu/2015/06/18/okla-quake-drilling-061815/. 
 42. See Id.  
 43. The Federal Safe Water Drinking Act (“SWDA”), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h(d)(1)(B) (West 
2016). 
 44. Id.  
 45. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); F.D.I.C. v. Schuchmann, 235 F.3d 1217 
(10th Cir. 2000). 
 46. Schuchmann, 235 F.3d at 1225.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/3
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breach of contract suit.47 Similarly, in Washington Life Insurance Co. v. 
Lovejoy, insured recovered insurance premiums paid after insurance 
company breached contract.48 Also, in Mills v. Dailey, a divorcee was 
allowed to recover certain insurance premiums paid from the father of her 
children.49 In Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P’ship, the court was 
unwilling to award punitive-style tort damages for breach of contract but did 
allow for the recovery of the cost to purchase insurance.50 Further, in Awuah 
v. Coverall North American Inc., insurance premium recovery was statutorily 
enforced.51 Finally, in Claudet v. Weyrich, the future cost of insurance 
premiums to be paid were awarded for medical malpractice.52 
However, in Severn Place Associates v. American Building Services, Inc., 
increased insurance premiums allegedly arising from tortfeasor’s negligence 
were not awarded because the suing party could not show the conduct was 
the cause of the injury in question.53 On appeal, the appellate court further 
rationalized the premiums could not be awarded as a policy matter and the 
damages were “too remote.”54 Similarly, in Nikolaus v. City of Baton Rouge, 
insurance premiums were not awarded under the Severn Place55 ruling, based 
on a lack of cause of action for recovery under theories of strict liability or 
negligence.56 
C. Oil and Gas Operations  
In Oklahoma and under federal law, landowners generally have recourse 
against oil and gas operators for their harmful activities or presence on leased 
property in the form of either tort or environmental claims.57 Claims may take 
the form of nuisance, negligence, trespass, constructive fraud, unjust 
enrichment, and breach of contract.58 Meritorious claims may allow for 
recovery of damages for permanent and temporary injury to real property; 
                                                                                                                 
 47. 61 F.Supp.3d 306, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
 48. 149 S.W. 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). 
 49. 38 So. 3d 731 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).  
 50. 749 N.E. 2d 196 (N.Y. 2001). 
 51. 952 N.E.2d 890, 900 (Mass. 2011). 
 52. 662 So.2d 131, 132 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).  
 53. 930 So. 2d 125, 129 (La. App. 2006).  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. 40 So. 3d 1244, 1248 (La. App. 2010). 
 57. Roger Meiners and Bruce Yandle, The Common Law: How it Protects the 
Environment (May 1, 1998), https://www.perc.org/1998/05/01/the-common-law-how-it-
protects-the-environment/). 
 58. Id.  
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injury to personal property; injury to person; lost rents or profits; annoyances, 
inconveniences, discomfort and loss of enjoyment; costs of investigation and 
remediation; punitive damages; injunction; abatement; and attorney’s fees 
and costs.59 When pursued in the environmental claim context, claims often 
arise under the Safe Drinking Water Act, National Environmental Policy Act, 
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, or UIC regulatory violations.60  
Seismicity induced by oil and gas operations has caused a unique strain of 
litigation. Anthropogenic seismicity, unlike naturally occurring seismicity, is 
not considered an “Act of God” because it involves human interference.61 
Acts of God are often exempted from liability due to lack of foreseeability or 
based on force majeure clauses in contracts.62 Generally, strict liability as a 
cause of action has been rejected for oil and gas operations.63  
In general-tort actions, plaintiffs often face the impossible obstacle of 
proving what event caused the alleged damage and what company was 
specifically responsible for the harmful event.64 Further, restraints from the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and disallowance of speculative evidence under 
Shell Oil Co. v. Haunchild65 make establishing legal liability to a particular 
party extremely difficult without experts and at least circumstantial 
evidence.66 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of 
an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the 
witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the 
witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not 
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
within the scope of Rule 702.67  
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id.  
 60. SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300f, et seq.; NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; CAA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7401 et seq.; CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq.  
 61. Ehrman, supra note 17, at 645–46 (citation omitted).  
 62. See R.R. Co. v. Reeves, 77 U.S. 176 (1869) and Golsen v. ONG Western, INC., 1988 
OK 26, 756 P.2d 1209.  
 63. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936) and Doddy v. OXY USA, 
INC., 101 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 64. See Ehrman, supra note 17, at 645–46. 
 65. 1950 OK 250, 223 P.2d 333.  
 66. FED. R. EVID. 701. Opinion Testimony by Law Witness and FED. R. EVID. 702. 
Testimony by Expert Witnesses. 
 67. FED. R. EVID. 701. Opinion Testimony by Law Witness. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/3
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opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the 
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is 
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert 
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.68 
Though the OCC has primacy and jurisdiction in regulating oil and gas 
operations, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the OCC powers do 
not extend to many litigious matters.69 The court, in Ladra v. New Dominion 
LLC et al., ruled that OCC’s jurisdiction was “limited to the resolution of 
public rights, and it lacks jurisdiction over disputes between two or more 
private persons or entities not involving public rights.”70 
III. Statement of the case 
A. Facts 
 Oklahoma property owners Matt Meier, Sheryl Meier, and Kai Bach 
(“Property Owners”) brought suit in state court in Payne County in 2017, on 
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.71 Defendants to the action 
included: Chesapeake Operating L.L.C.; Devon Energy Production 
Company, LP; Midstates Petroleum Company LLC; New Dominion, LLC; 
Range Production Company, LLC; Special Energy Corporation; and White 
Star Petroleum, (“Operators”) who were considered by the Plaintiffs to be 
“some of the largest operators of wastewater injection wells in the Arbuckle 
formation.”72 Property Owners brought suit to recover alleged damages 
resulting from insurance premiums paid to obtain earthquake insurance.73  
Property Owners believed that Operators’ use of wastewater injection 
wells drilled into the Arbuckle formation had caused thousands of man-made 
earthquakes throughout the state since 2008.74 Property owners claimed that 
they and those in similar positions, had been forced to acquire earthquake 
                                                                                                                 
 68. FED. R. EVID. 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses. 
 69. Ladra v. New Dominion LLC et al., 2015 OK 5 ¶ 10, 353 P.3d 529. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Meier v. Chesapeake Operating L.L.C., 324 F.Supp.3d 1207 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 13, 
2018).  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
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insurance to protect their property and themselves from financial distress.75 
Property Owners also alleged the increased seismic activity had caused 
insurance premium prices to skyrocket.76  
Property Owners brought suit under theories of public and private 
nuisance, strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities, and negligence.77 
Damages sought included: punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and 
recoup of costs for acquiring and maintaining earthquake insurance coverage 
since 2009.78 
B. Procedural History 
Operator Devon Energy removed the Property Owners’ action to federal 
court, in accordance with the Class Action Fairness Act.79 All Operators then 
moved to dismiss Property Owners’ complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.80 Operator Midstates also sought to dismiss 
the complaint and strike all prepetition date claims due to the company’s 
bankruptcy case.81 Further, Operator Chesapeake sought to dismiss the 
complaint for a lack of ripeness of claims.82 The main issue before the Meier 
court was whether or not a party may recover, as damages in a tort action, 
the money paid toward insurance premiums to protect against future events.83  
C. Holding 
 The Western District Court held that Property Owners were not entitled 
to recover for any of the damages sought in their pleading.84 Additionally, 
the court granted Operators’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the Property 
Owners had not plead to be entitled to any appropriate relief.85 Further, 
Property Owners’ class action petition was dismissed with prejudice.86  
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. 
 76. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d 1207. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.; The Class Action Fairness Act 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d) (West 2011).  
 80. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).  
 81. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d 1207 (Federal bankruptcy court order barred collection on 
claims arising before Midstates’ bankruptcy petition). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 1220.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1220. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/3




The Western District Court decided the Property Owners lacked an 
appropriate cause of action to recoup damages for the insurance premiums.87 
The court recognized the claim was one of first impression for Oklahoma and 
relied upon its duty to predict whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court would 
find the suggested relief “legally cognizable” as the basis for its authority on 
the matter.88 The court rejected the Property Owners’ case law allowing for 
recovery of insurance premiums as damages, distinguishing the proffered 
cases as allowing recovery on different basis—contractual, statutory, or other 
tort theory.89 The court, instead, adopted the view taken by the Operators’ 
authority which, opined that “no right of action exists for recovery of 
insurance premiums based on a tortfeasor’s negligence or strict liability.”90 
A. Jurisdictional Issues and Midstates’ Bankruptcy Case 
 Midstates filed for voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief in April of 
2016.91 On October 21, 2016, the Chapter 11 repayment plan was confirmed, 
discharging all claims against Midstates arising prior to the confirmation 
date.92 Midstates argued that due to its bankruptcy discharge, Property 
Owner’s claims arising before the confirmation date were barred as a 
jurisdictional issue and as a matter of bankruptcy law.93 Bankruptcy courts 
are generally charged with jurisdiction over all bankruptcy proceedings.94  
The court agreed with Midstates, barring any consideration of operations 
prior to the discharge date, dismissing Property Owners’ claims to the extent 
that activities arose prior to October 21, 2016.95 The court did not, however, 
on bankruptcy grounds, dismiss any claims arising after the confirmation 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1215. 
 89. Id. See also Interkal, Inc. v. UIS, Inc., 132 F.3d 33 (6th Cir. 1997); Seifts v. Consumer 
Health Sol. LLC, 61 F.Supp.3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Inchaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. 
P’ship, 268 A.D.2d 121, 706 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dept. 2000); Supreme Lodge Knights of 
Pythias v. Neeley, 135 1046 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc, 460 Mass. 
484, N.E.2d. 890 (2011); Bos. Children’s Heart Found., Inc. v. Nadal-Ginard, 1994 WL 
16011252 (D. Mass. 1994); Claudet v. Weyrich, 662 So.2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995). 
 90. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1216 (quoting Nikolaus v. City of Baton Rouge, 40 So.3d 
1244, 1248 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2010)).  
 91. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1210.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West 2018).  
 95. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1211.  
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date.96 The court reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code did not preclude the 
court from deciding disputes arising post-discharge and therefore, the court 
could consider the merits of the Property Owners’ claims for the post-
discharge claims.97  
B. Motions to Dismiss 
 Chesapeake Operating L.L.C. sought to dismiss Property Owners’ 
complaint based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of 
standing and lack of ripeness of claims.98 The court explained that for Article 
III standing the Property Owners were charged with proving that (1) they 
suffered an injury in fact; (2) that the injury was fairly traceable to the action 
of the Operators; and (3) that it was likely the injury would be redressed by 
a favorable decision.99 The court concluded that, against the Operator’s 
objection, the complaint was sufficient to establish Article III standing.100  
The court explained the injury in fact prong was satisfied because it could 
“reasonably infer” the Property Owners would have used their money 
differently had they not been compelled to purchase the earthquake 
insurance.101 Further, the court explained the second causation prong was 
satisfied because the Property Owners’ complaint sufficiently established 
their economic injury was not “solely attributable” to their own conduct.102 
Finally, the court explained the final prong of redressability was satisfied 
because the relief sought would redress the alleged injury, regardless of 
whether or not the relief was proper.103 
The court further denied Operator’s challenge to Property Owners’ claim 
ripeness.104 The court explained that because Property Owners’ claim did not 
rest on uncertain or contingent future events, the claim was ripe for 
adjudication.105 All Operators challenged the sufficiency of Property 
Owners’ complaint.106 The court ultimately granted the motion to dismiss 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at 1211–1212.  
 97. Id.  
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d 
at 1212. 
 99. .Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1212 (citing Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1144 
(10th Cir. 2013)). 
 100. Id. at 1213–1214.  
 101. Id. at 1213.  
 102. Id. at 1213–1214.  
 103. Id. at 1214.  
 104. Id. at 1214.  
 105. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1214.  
 106. Id. at 1214–1215.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/3
2019]  Meier v. Chesapeake Operating 749 
 
 
under 12(b)(6) upon concluding the Property Owners were not entitled to any 
of the relief set out for recovery in their pleadings.107  
C. Substantive Issues and Loss of Chance Doctrine  
The court noted that though the Loss of Chance Doctrine had been adopted 
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the higher court had only done so in a 
limited medical malpractice scope.108 The configuration for the doctrine did 
not include insurance premiums.109 The Loss of Chance Doctrine, as relied 
upon by Property Owners, is described by professor David A. Fischer: 
This [proportional risk recovery] awards a reduced recovery to 
any person exposed to a risk of future harm that has not yet come 
to pass. Not all of these persons will actually suffer harm, but each 
has suffered a loss in an actuarial sense because his chances of 
avoiding the harm have been reduced. These kinds of losses can 
often be insured against, and plaintiffs that use their recoveries to 
purchase such insurance are not overcompensated. Those 
plaintiffs that actually suffer the future loss will receive 
appropriate compensation from their insurance companies. Those 
plaintiffs that do not suffer the future loss receive nothing from 
their insurance companies, and thus are not overcompensated.110 
The court also rejected the Property Owners’ contention that recovery was 
appropriate under Article 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution—“[t]he courts of 
justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain 
remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or 
reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, 
delay, or prejudice[,]”111—as well as Title 23 of the Oklahoma Statutes.112  
The sections of Title 23 at issue were §§ 3—“[a]ny person who suffers 
detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from 
the person in fault a compensation therefore in money, which is called 
damages[,]”—and 61— “[f]or the breach of an obligation not arising from 
contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. at 1220.  
 108. Meier, 324 F.Supp.3d at 1217-1218. See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., 1987 OK 
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 109. Id.  
 110. David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605, 
633 (2001).  
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provided by this Chapter 1, is the amount which will compensate for all 
detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated 
or not.”113 The court cited precedent directly from the Western District that 
did not allow recovery, based off of the constitutional or statute provisions, 
for medical monitoring expenses.114  
Further, the court relied on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of Article 2, citing that Section 6 was intended “to guarantee that the judiciary 
would be open and available for the resolution of disputes, but not to 
guarantee that any particular set of events would result in court-awarded 
relief.”115 In consideration of Property Owners’ Title 23 argument, the court 
relied on the common law for which the statutes codified.116 The cases did 
not recognize recovery of insurance premiums.117  
D. Oklahoma Tort Law  
The court then turned to Oklahoma tort law to determine whether the loss 
of the Property Owners’ should be passed on to the Operators under tort 
theory. The court listed several factors for consideration for a cause of action: 
(1) the severity of the risk of loss; (2) the nature of the activity causing the 
loss; and (3) whether the loss was sufficiently distinct from the general 
vicissitudes of life.118 The court further explained the “vicissitudes of life 
unavoidably present risks of harm which, equally unavoidably, vary in terms 
of severity and actual impact on any particular individual.”119  
The court opined that materialization of risk in the form of “tangible 
harm,” such as personal injury or property damage, was a prerequisite to a 
cause of action.120 The court further explained that the “limitation simply 
recognizes the fact that life abounds with events and phenomena by which a 
generalized risk faced by one person is increased in some way by the 
activities of another.”121  
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E. No Materialization of Harm  
The court’s holding rested on the decision that there had been no 
materialization of harm from risk of earthquake damage to Property Owners’ 
property.122 The court recognized the risk of harm was present but equated it 
to “any other risk,” drawing upon the rationale of harms from the 
“vicissitudes of life.”123 The court concluded that since the Property Owners’ 
had not sustained physical damage from the earthquakes, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court would not allow for recoup for the insurance premiums.124 In 
a final note, the court nixed the possibility of recovery under economic 
duress, citing Oklahoma precedent not allowing for economic duress as an 
independent tort.125 
V. Analysis 
Based on the general trend of authority toward recovery of insurance 
premiums and Oklahoma’s treatment of oil and gas liability, the Meier 
court’s decision makes judicial sense and was likely appropriately decided 
based how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would analyze the matter. The court 
rested heavily on the undisputed fact that the Property Owners had not felt 
any physical damage. The only alleged damage was in the form of insurance 
premiums and of an alleged increase in said insurance premiums due to 
Operators’ activity. The court relied heavily on this distinction for their 
conclusion.  
The court compared the alleged injuries sustained by the Property Owners 
to that of the general harms and risks of life. The court’s decision ultimately 
rested on the inability to properly assign damages in an instance where there 
had been no solid or tangible manifestation of the proposed harm—personal 
or property injury. In consideration of general tort law, this rationale is 
natural.  
Tort law refuses to allow recovery in instances where there are intervening 
or superseding causes in the chain of events harming the plaintiff.126 Where 
there is uncertainty in causation, it is generally inappropriate to assign all 
liability of proximate cause to a party. The court’s rationale here was parallel 
with these general tort concepts—as a policy matter, precluding recovery 
where the causal chain of events and harm cannot be established. Here, the 
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courts focused on the risks from the “vicissitudes of life” as causing 
uncertainty where there was no materialization of the harm, a very natural 
interpretation in the context of Oklahoma tort law.  
A. Negligence and Policy Considerations  
By relying on the Severn Place decision, the Meier court inadvertently 
adopted the policy of the Louisiana appellate court.127 The Louisiana court 
adopted language from a precedent case and opined that when determining 
the duty of a party in a negligence case, the question as to what falls within 
the scope of duty is ultimately a policy question.128 The court adopted a strict 
view for analyzing when third parties might be liable to policyholders for 
increased insurance paid to an insurer because allowing same would “open[] 
the door to remote damages that are better precluded as a matter of public 
policy.”129  
The court explained that allowing such recovery would leave the door for 
recovery too open with “no sensible or just stopping point.”130 The court was 
concerned with the proportionality of defendants’ responsibility to the 
alleged injury.131 The court noted that several other states had taken a similar 
view, not allowing for recovery of insurance premiums for negligence.132  
As a policy matter and in consideration of Oklahoma tort law, this policy 
conclusion is appropriately translatable to the Oklahoma case. Where there 
is uncertainty and concern in assigning liability for damages without direct 
causation and harm and a general concern about assigning insurance 
premium costs to third parties, it would make no judicial sense to require an 
alleged party to account for the alleged harm where there is a general dislike 
for assigning insurance premiums, a missing link in causation, and no 
materialization of harm.  
B. Mechanisms for Recovery in Oil & Gas Litigation  
Operators of oil and gas ventures are often held liable for their misconduct 
and oversight through breach of contract, common law, or statutory 
mechanisms. Damages to property in Oklahoma, are often recovered based 
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off of the Reasonable Use Doctrine133 for post-drilling activities or the 
Surface Damage Act for drilling activities.134 The premise for these 
mechanisms, however, generally only provides relief for the landowners for 
which the operations are occurring on and are only for damages at the 
operation site—not for damage done off of the actual site.135 For landowners 
like the Property Owners in Meier v. Chesapeake Operating, this gap in 
Oklahoma Law leaves such landowners susceptible to damage that is 
unprovable and unrecoverable.  
C. Res Ipsa Loquitur Possibilities 
Going forward, a doctrine that might eventually provide some answers or 
ability to compensate based on scientific study and OCC regulation, is Res 
Ipsa Loquitur.136 The Res Ipsa Doctrine provides a way to prove negligence 
by using an inference or a rebuttable presumption of negligent activity.137 
The Doctrine requires proof by the landowner that (1) the instrumentality that 
caused injury was in the operator’s exclusive control, (2) the type of damage 
incurred does not happen but for negligence, (3) there are no other potential 
causes of the damage, and (4) the operator was not in a position to know 
about the potential damage.138  
For this doctrine to ever be appropriate or help landowners like the 
Property Owners in Meier v. Chesapeake Operating, there would have to be 
a consensus of science and regulators that induced seismicity does not occur 
but for negligence. Though it might be argued that drilling too deeply into 
basement rock when drilling or reworking injection wells is negligent, it does 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See Briscoe, Inc. v. Peters, 1954 OK 107, 269 P.2d 787 and Gulf Refining Co. v. 
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not appear, overall, that there is enough scientific support and consensus to 
support this as a legal concept, enough to assign negligence liability or meet 
the required standards of proof.139 It appears as though the industry needs 
more scientific research and trial and error to really be able to appropriately 
assign liability based on the “but for” prong.  
As previously discussed, landowners face evidentiary issues in the 
assignment of liability against operators.140 Such an obstacle would have to 
be overcome for a successful Res Ipsa Negligence claim as well. The 
damaging instrumentality has to be in the exclusive control of the operator in 
order to establish Res Ipsa liability.141  
Again, there is likely not enough science or consensus to support liability 
in the current state of the industry. The evidentiary issues stem from a need 
for experts to have the ability to pinpoint the area and operator who 
specifically induced seismicity.142 Also, considering the dramatic change in 
regulatory schemes dealing with oil and gas operations over the last 50 years, 
it is hard to regulate and assign liability where many wells were drilled or 
commissioned in a different regulatory era. However, with the OCC’s recent 
UIC initiatives it seems as though operators are being held to a higher 
standard in Oklahoma with what wells they may use and to what depths they 
may drill new wells.143  
Further, proving a lack of other potential causes for the damages would be 
difficult and require considerable expert-input. Particularly, in the Meier v. 
Chesapeake Operating case, Property Owners would be charged with the 
obstacle of proving that there were no other driving forces behind the 
increase in earthquake premiums. Any such proof would require expert 
analysis and testimony from a variety of industries and still might not be 
accepted.144  
There is the overall question of whether, as a matter of policy considering 
Oklahoma’s economic dependence on oil and gas operations, it would be a 
prudent adaptation of law to allow presumptive negligence to attach to 
induced seismicity. The Meier v. Chesapeake Operating court made similar 
policy considerations in their discussion of the “vicissitudes of life.”145 
Perhaps, as a matter of policy, it is better that such fleeting instances of 
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damage to landowners with such abstract causes and fault are considered part 
of the risk of living in Oklahoma and benefitting from the oil-rich economy. 
However, in considering the interests of similarly situated landowners 
experiencing economic loss from such activities, it is a theory that must at 
least be considered.  
D. Denial of Economic Duress  
The Meier v. Chesapeake Operating court ruled out economic duress as a 
basis for recovery for the Property Owners.146 The court explained that the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court had ruled out the theory as an independent basis 
of tort recovery.147 Based on the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruling, the theory 
may only be advanced as an “equitable doctrine in contract law.”148  
Economic duress would make for an interesting mechanism for recovery, 
in theory, for landowners like the Property Owners in Meier v. Chesapeake 
Operating. The elements to prove economic duress under intentional tort law 
include: (1) a contract that results from a wrongful or unlawful act by 
coercing party who knew of the coercive impact and acted intentionally to 
coerce, (2) there is no reasonable alternative for the coerced party to the 
contract, and (3) the coerced party was detrimentally affected by the 
coercion.149 The concept of indemnity and assignment of liability would 
likely pose a problem for recovery under this theory as the elements would 
be established against the insurance company for which the contract was 
made with—not the oil and gas operators.150  
E. Denial of Constitutional and Statutory Arguments  
The Meier v. Chesapeake Operating court also rejected the Property 
Owners’ theories of recovery based on Article 2 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution151 and Oklahoma Statute.152 The court reasoned, specifically, 
that Section 6 of Article 2 does not guarantee a plaintiff a specific remedy in 
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a case but instead is intended to guarantee the judicial branch be “open and 
available for resolution of disputes.”153 
This conclusion by the federal court aligns well with rulings from the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court. In Anadarko v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge, 
118 the Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically explained that “Section 6 is 
most often used to insure equal access to court, regardless of status.”154 
Therefore, it would have been inappropriate for the District Court to have 
afforded relief to the Property Owners based on the theory that the Article 
warranted the specific recovery of insurance premiums.  
Further, the court considered Property Owners’ contention that Oklahoma 
Statutes Title 23 Sections 3 and 61 required recovery of insurance 
premiums.155 However, the court explained the sections were mere 
codification of common law and there was no precedence for allowing recoup 
of insurance premiums based on the statutes.156 Again, this is a clear 
distinction of Oklahoma law where the District Court had only one 
appropriate way to rule.  
F. Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC et al. 
The Western District Court faced a similar case involving induced 
seismicity in 2017. In Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, an 
environmental organization brought suit against similar operators under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act157 for declaratory and injunctive 
relief.158 The environmental organization alleged an increase in seismic 
activity due to operators’ deep injection of waste.159 The environmental 
organization sought to have the operators reduce the amount of waste being 
injected to fix any structures that might be vulnerable if there were to be a 
large seismic activity and to engineer a monitoring mechanism for predicting 
unsafe injection levels.160 The operators contended that the court should 
abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Burford abstention doctrine.161 
The Burford abstention doctrine advises that: 
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Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a 
federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the 
proceedings or orders of the state administrative agencies: (1) 
when there are difficult questions of law bearing on policy 
problems of substantial public import whose importance 
transcends the result in the case then at bar; or (2) where the 
exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar 
cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent 
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.162 
 The court agreed with the operators that dismissal was appropriate under the 
Burford abstention doctrine.163  
Though the court recognized the importance and severity of induced 
seismicity, it opined that the OCC had “. . . . responded energetically . . . .” 
to the challenge of regulatory activity concerning earthquakes.164 The court 
also explained that the OCC was technically better prepared to respond to 
and investigate the concerns of the environmental organization and others 
similarly situated.165 This case, like Meier v. Chesapeake Operating, did not 
allow the district court to advance far on the development of law in the area. 
The framing of the cases along with the procedural implications kept the 
courts from having the ability to advance the legal framework.  
G. Decision Impact 
The court’s decision in Meier v. Chesapeake Operating will likely have 
several important impacts on future oil and gas litigation. First, the decision 
solidifies the state’s favorability of and commitment to the oil and gas 
industry. Though the court did not exercise judicial overreach and did an 
admirable job of predicting how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule, it 
potentially could have fashioned a holding, using judicial overreach, to 
promote the attachment of new liability to oil and gas operators.  
Second, since the decision was based centrally on insurance law and not 
oil and gas principles, it leaves room for future litigation to define the 
contours of the law surrounding claims similar to Property Owners’. For 
example, had Property Owners brought a claim supporting and citing cases 
where operators had been held liable for similar alleged damages under oil 
and gas principles, an Oklahoma court would have the opportunity to provide 
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instruction for an exact framework for the erroneously named “frackquake” 
cases. 
Meier v. Chesapeake Operating managed to sidestep having to make any 
guesses as to what the Oklahoma Supreme Court would want the framework 
to be based off the way Property Owner’s attorneys framed the issue, using 
cases that were insurance and contract oriented. This move by Property 
Owner’s council was likely a strategic approach, considering the state’s 
overall favorability to the industry. 
Third, the decision will likely prompt prudent insurance carriers to 
consider the reengineering of insurance policies in terms of earthquake 
liability. If disturbance of basement rock is going to cause some induced 
seismicity—however minute—and disturbance of basement rock is going to 
be a reality, to some extent, in a natural-resource-active state, competitive 
insurers will want to provide their clients with a competitive advantage in 
coverage. They will also want to be prepared to protect themselves from 
future litigation of the Meier v. Chesapeake Operating tune that might, under 
different circumstances, find insurers liable for more than they bargained for.  
Furthermore, the decision will likely prompt prudent oil and gas 
companies of all trades to consider their liability for seismic activity. Being 
proactive as a company, in terms of foreseeing potential liabilities, is an 
important function essential to survival. Considering the rise in litigation 
similar to Meier v. Chesapeake Operating, diligence would suggest the legal 
teams in any such companies should consider how they can be proactive to 
manage future risk, in the contracts and protocols they are implementing 
now. It would also be prudent for these companies to consider their policies 
surrounding environmental proactivity in terms of seismicity and injection 
wells. Though the OCC imposes certain regulations, companies might 
consider going above and beyond the regulations to maintain favor with 
Oklahoma constituents.  
Undoubtedly, the beginning of this type of litigation in Oklahoma will 
likely reinforce the Oklahoma Corporation Commission’s dedication to 
regulating injection activities to prevent unnecessary disturbance of 
basement rock. The OCC has already shown dedication to regulating any 
activity that might cause induced seismicity, however, as individuals begin 
to look for ways to recover against oil and gas operators for said seismicity, 
the OCC will have to remain diligent in its pursuant of balanced regulation 
of the oil and gas industry. 
Finally, the Oklahoma decision could potentially influence other states’ 
treatment of similar cases. Though the court in Meier v. Chesapeake 
Operating sidestepped some oil and gas decision-making, its overall 
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disposition and treatment of the case could influence other oil-and-gas-
friendly states in favor of operators.  
As a final thought, it would be interesting to see how liable operators could 
be held for negligently disturbing basement rock. If the disturbance of 
basement rock is the main cause of induced seismicity and the OCC is 
working to regulate injection well depths and quality, could there not be 
liability found where a company negligently—without conforming to the 
industry-accepted duty—drilled too deeply into or disturbed basement rock? 
Operators spend a large amount of money and time on diagnostic tests to 
promote efficiency in production and operation.  
If similar resources were committed to the quality of injection wells and 
investigatory resources, possibly through the Oklahoma Geological Survey 
and OCC, maybe negligence could be a cause of action for disturbance of 
basement rock. For this to ever be a possibility, more consensus must be 
reached on the cause of induced seismicity, the appropriate legal standards 
for measuring such negligence must be established, and technology overall 
needs to be more prepared to cater to such investigatory needs.  
VI. Conclusion 
It is easy to see why Oklahoma state courts tend to give oil and gas 
companies the benefit of the doubt when possible. Oklahoma’s historical and 
continued reliance on the industry makes for important policy concerns when 
courts have to consider liabilities be imposed on such companies. The 
imposition of certain liabilities without significant scientific and technical 
support is not realistic for a state that relies on and generally supports the oil 
and gas industry. 
Such notions are expounded when applied to the concept of induced 
seismicity. Without the technology and legal and scientific consensus to be 
able to fairly and accurately pinpoint liability, there can be no arbitrary 
liability placed in a state that relies on the industry so heavily. Though the 
Oklahoma Corporation Commission has shown an admirable commitment to 
regulating activity that might induce seismic activity, it is a campaign that 
will have to continue and evolve as science and technology do.  
Cases like Meier v. Chesapeake Operating provide for an interesting 
cross-section of oil and gas law principles, contract, tort, and insurance law. 
The way the case was presented and framed for the court did not allow them 
much leeway in developing new landscape law for the oil and gas industry 
but still imposes important implications. It will be enthralling to see how 
other courts within the state handle induced seismicity issues going forward. 
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